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In this paper, we consider a company where surplus follows a rather general diffusion
process and whose objective is to maximize expected discounted dividend payments. With
each dividend payment there are transaction costs and taxes and it is shown in [7] that
under some reasonable assumptions, optimality is achieved by using a lump sum dividend
barrier strategy, i.e. there is an upper barrier u¯∗ and a lower barrier u∗ so that whenever
surplus reaches u¯∗, it is reduced to u∗ through a dividend payment. However, these optimal
barriers may be unacceptably low from a solvency point of view. It is argued that in that
case one should still we should look for a barrier strategy, but with barriers that satisfy a
given constraint. We propose a solvency constraint similar to that in [6]; whenever dividends
are paid out the probability of ruin within a fixed time T and with the same strategy in
the future, should not exceed a predetermined level ε. It is shown how optimality can be
achieved under this constraint, and numerical examples are given.
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1. Introduction
Finding optimal dividend strategies is a classical problem in the financial and actuarial
literature. The idea is that the company wants to pay some of its surplus as dividends, and the
problem is to find a dividend strategy that maximizes the expected total discounted dividends
received by the shareholders. The typical time horizon is until ruin occurs, i.e. until the surplus
is negative for the first time.
However, left to their own, financial institutions may make decisions that can jeopardize
their solvency, and those with a claim on the company, e.g. account holders of a bank or
customers of an insurance company, have an unacceptably high probability of loosing all or
parts of their claims. As a consequence, most countries impose some regulation on financial
companies, and in addition the companies themselves will usually have their own, albeit
sometimes lax, capital requirements.
The task for the management is therefore not to maximize expected discounted dividends
as such, but to do it under proper solvency constraints. One such constraint was suggested in
[6], and we shall apply the same idea in this paper. We also let the capital of the company
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follow the same diffusion process as in [6], originally presented in [11]. To explain, in [11] it
was proved that with their model, and provided there are no costs or taxes associated with
dividend payments, if an optimal policy exists it is of barrier type, i.e. there is a barrier u∗
so that whenever capital reaches u∗, dividends are paid with infinitesimal amounts so that
capital never exceeds u∗. The resulting accumulated dividend process is a singular process,
hence the name singular control. With the same setup, in [6] it was proved that when solvency
requirements prohibit dividend payments unless capital is at least u0 > u
∗, then it is optimal to
use a singular control at u0. Therefore, it is natural to use u0 as a barrier, and it was suggested
that u0 could be determined as follows: whenever capital is at u0, ruin within a fixed time T
by following the same policy should not exceed a small, predetermined number ε. We denote
the corresponding u0 by uε. Thus the problem of optimal dividend payments was linked to the
problem of calculating ruin probabilities, the latter being a key concept in risk theory. Clearly,
increasing u0 implies that the ruin probability is decreased, so the problem can be reduced to a
one dimensional search problem for uε. Although in both [11] and [6] there were no transaction
costs or taxes, proportional costs or taxes will not change the problem significantly. However,
when each dividend payment carries a fixed cost, the problem changes from a singular control
problem to an impulse control problem. It was shown in [7], using the same diffusion model
as in [11], that if there is an optimal dividend strategy it will be of a two-barrier type. To
explain, there is a lower barrier u∗ ≥ 0 and an upper barrier u¯∗ so that when capital reaches
u¯∗, dividends are paid bringing the capital down to u∗.
In this paper we will make the same assumptions as in [7], but slightly differently formulated.
With each dividend payment there is a fixed cost K and a tax rate 1 − k with 0 < k < 1. We
will argue that if the optimal policy is too risky, look for a lower barrier uε > 0 and an upper
barrier u¯ε that maximizes expected discounted dividends and at the same time satisfy the
solvency constraint as presented in the above paragraph. This problem is more difficult than
that in [6] since we must look for a pair (uε, u¯ε), not just a number uε. One issue is to find a
fast method to calculate the ruin probability for a given lower and upper barrier, and we will
show how we can adapt the Thomas algorithm for solving tridiagonal systems together with
the Crank-Nicolson algorithm to solve the relevant partial differential equations. The paper
ends with numerical examples.
2. The model and a general optimality result
Let (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0, P ) be a probability space satisfying the usual conditions, i.e. the filtration
{Ft}t≥0 is right continuous and P -complete. Assume that the uncontrolled surplus process
follows the stochastic differential equation
dXt = µ(Xt)dt+ σ(Xt)dWt, X0 = x, (2.1)
where W is a Brownian motion on the probability space and µ(x) and σ(x) are Lipschitz-
continuous. Let the company pay dividends to its shareholders, but at a fixed transaction cost
K > 0 and a tax rate 0 < 1 − k < 1. This means that if ξ > 0 is the amount by which the
capital is reduced, then the net amount of money the shareholders receive is kξ − K. Since
every dividend payment results in a transaction cost K > 0, the company should not pay out
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dividends continuously but only at discrete time epochs. Therefore, a strategy can be described
by
pi = (τpi1 , τ
pi
2 , . . ., τ
pi
n , . . .; ξ
pi
1 , ξ
pi
2 . . ., ξ
pi
n , . . .),
where τpin and ξ
pi
n denote the times and amounts of dividends. Thus, when applying the strategy
pi, the resulting surplus process Xpit is given by
Xpit = x+
∫ t
0
µ(Xpis )ds+
∫ t
0
σ(Xpis )dWs −
∞∑
n=1
1{τpin<t}ξ
pi
n . (2.2)
The process Xpi is left continuous with right limits, so when applying e.g. Itoˆ’s formula, it will
be on the right continuous with left limit version {Xt+}. Also, we define ∆Xt = Xt+ −Xt.
Sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of (2.2) are assumptions A1 and A2 below.
Definition 2.1. A strategy pi is said to be admissible if
(i) 0 ≤ τpi1 and for n ≥ 1, τpin+1 > τpin on {τpin <∞}.
(ii) τpin is a stopping time with respect to {Ft}t≥0, n = 1, 2. . . .
(iii) ξpin is measurable with respect to Fτpin , n = 1, 2. . . .
(iv) P
(
lim
n→∞ τ
pi
n ≤ T
)
= 0, ∀T ≥ 0.
(v) 0 < ξpin ≤ Xpiτn .
We denote the set of all admissible strategies by Π.
With each admissible strategy pi we define the corresponding ruin time as
τpi := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xpit < 0}
and the performance function Vpi(x) as
Vpi(x) = Ex
[ ∞∑
n=1
e−λτ
pi
n (kξpin −K)1{τpin≤τpi}
]
,
where by Px we mean the probability measure conditioned on X0 = x. Vpi(x) represents the
expected total discounted dividends received by the shareholders until ruin when the initial
reserve is x. Since we deal with the optimization problem on the time interval [0, τpi], we can
assume without loss of generality that Xpit ≡ 0 for t > τpi.
Define the optimal return function
V ∗(x) = sup
pi∈Π
Vpi(x)
and the optimal strategy, if it exists, by pi∗. Then Vpi∗(x) = V ∗(x).
Definition 2.2 A lump sum dividend barrier strategy pi = piu¯,u with the parameters u¯ and u
satisfies for Xpi0 < u¯,
τpi1 = inf{t > 0 : Xpit = u¯}, ξpi1 = u¯− u,
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and for every n ≥ 2,
τpin = inf{t > τpin−1 : Xpit = u¯}, ξpin = u¯− u.
When Xpi0 ≥ u¯,
τpi1 = 0, ξ
pi
1 = X
pi
0 − u,
and for every n ≥ 2, τpin is defined as above.
With a given lump sum dividend barrier strategy piu¯,u, the corresponding value function is
denoted by Vu¯,u(x).
The importance of the lump sum dividend barrier strategies is exemplified in e.g. Theorem
2.1 below, proved in [7]. In order to present the theorem, we make a list of assumptions.
A1. | µ(x) | + | σ(x) |≤ C(1 + x) for all x ≥ 0 and some C > 0.
A2. µ(x) and σ(x) are continuously differentiable and Lipschitz continuous, and the derivatives
µ′(x) and σ′(x) are Lipschitz continuous for all x ≥ 0.
A3. σ2(x) > 0 for all x ≥ 0.
A4. µ′(x) ≤ λ for all x ≥ 0, where λ is the discounting rate.
Define the operator L by
Lg(x) = 1
2
σ2(x)g′′(x) + µ(x)g′(x)− λg(x)
for g ∈ C2(0,∞). It is well known, see e.g. [7], that under the assumptions A1-A3 any solution
of Lg = 0 is in C2(0,∞). Let g1(x) and g2(x) be two independent solutions of Lg(x) = 0, chosen
so that g(x) = g1(0)g2(x)−g2(0)g1(x) has g′(0) > 0. Any such solution will be called a canonical
solution. Then any solution LV (x) = 0 with V (0) = 0 and V ′(0) > 0 is of the form
V (x) = cg(x), c > 0.
Consider the following set of problems.
B1: LV (x) = 0, 0 < x < u¯∗,
V (0) = 0,
V (x) = V (u¯∗) + k(x− u¯∗), x > u¯∗.
B2: V (u¯∗) = V (u∗) + k(u¯∗ − u∗)−K,
V ′(u¯∗) = k,
V ′(u∗) = k.
B3: V (u¯∗) = ku¯∗ −K,
V ′(u¯∗) = k.
Note that k and K are equivalent to 11+d1 and
d0
1+d1
in [7].
Theorem 2.1. (Theorem 2.1 in [7]) Assume that A1 − A4 hold. Then exactly one of the
following three cases will occur.
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(i) B1+B2 have a unique solution for unknown V (x), u¯∗ and u∗ and V ∗(x) = V (x) = Vu¯∗,u∗(x)
for all x ≥ 0. Thus the lump sum dividend barrier strategy pi∗ = piu¯∗,u∗ is an optimal
strategy.
(ii) B1+B3 have a unique solution for unknown V (x) and V ∗(x) = V (x) = Vu¯∗,0(x) for all
x ≥ 0. Thus the lump sum dividend barrier strategy pi∗ = piu¯∗,0 is an optimal strategy.
(iii) There does not exist an optimal strategy, but
V ∗(x) = lim
u¯→∞Vu¯,u(u¯)(x)
and this limit exists and is finite for every x ≥ 0. In terms of a canonical solution,
V ∗(x) =
kg(x)
limu¯→∞ g′(u¯)
.
Here Vu¯,u(u¯)(x) = supu∈[0,u¯) Vu¯,u(x).
Remark 2.1. As pointed out in Remark 2.2e in [7], if limx→∞ g′(x) =∞ then either B1+B2 or
B1+B3 apply, hence an optimal solution exists. That limx→∞ g′(x) = ∞ is almost a necessary
condition for existence of a solution can be shown as in Proposition 2.4 of [8]. Therefore, for
simplicity we will typically assume that limx→∞ g′(x) =∞.
Here is a useful sufficient condition for limx→∞ g′(x) =∞. The proof is given in the appendix.
Proposition 2.1. Assume A1-A4 and that there exists an x0 ≥ 0 and an ε > 0 so that
µ′(x) ≤ λ− ε, x ≥ x0.
Then for any canonical solution g of Lg(x) = 0,
lim
x→∞ g
′(x) =∞.
Remark 2.2. Arguing as in the end of the proof of Theorem 4.1, it follows that if there exists
an x0 ≥ 0 so that
µ′(x) = λ, x ≥ x0,
then limx→∞ g′(x) <∞. Therefore, Proposition 2.1 is quite sharp.
3. Optimality under payout restrictions
Consider e.g. an insurance company that wants to use the optimal barriers u¯∗ and u∗ for its
dividend payments. However, when policyholders pay their premiums in advance, they expect
to have their claims covered. It is therefore reasonable that the company should not be allowed
to pay dividends if that makes the surplus too small. One natural condition is that the surplus
is not allowed to be less than some u0 > 0 after a dividend payment. Mathematically, for a
policy pi such a restriction can be written as∑
0≤τpin≤τpi
1{Xτpin+<u0} = 0. (3.1)
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Let Π0 denote the set of all admissible strategies satisfying (3.1). Define the new optimal return
function V ∗0 (x) as
V ∗0 (x) = sup
pi∈Π0
Vpi(x). (3.2)
Our aim is to find the optimal return function V ∗0 (x) and the optimal strategy pi0 ∈ Π0 such
that Vpi0(x) = V
∗
0 (x).
Following Remark 2.1 we assume that limx→∞ g′(x) = ∞ so that either B1+B2 or B1+B3
have a solution. Trivially, if B1+B2 have a solution V (x) for some c∗, u¯∗ and u∗ ≥ u0,
the optimal strategy in case (i) of Theorem 2.1 is feasible under the constraint (3.1). Then
V ∗0 (x) = V (x) and the optimal strategy is as in case (i) of Theorem 2.1.
Therefore we consider the cases when B1+B2 have a solution V (x) for some c∗, u¯∗ and
u∗ < u0, or the case when B1+B3 have a solution V (x) for some c∗, u¯∗ and u∗ = 0. In
these cases, the optimal strategy given by Theorem 2.1 does not satisfy the constraint (3.1).
Consequently, we need to look for the optimal return function and the optimal strategy again.
To this end, consider the problem for unknown V and u¯0:
C: LV (x) = 0, 0 < x < u¯0,
V ′(u¯0) = k,
V (0) = 0,
V (x) = V (u0) + k(x− u0)−K, x ≥ u¯0.
The following result is proved in the appendix.
Theorem 3.1. Assume that A1-A4 hold and that limx→∞ g′(x) = ∞. Let u0 > u∗, where u∗
is given in Theorem 2.1. Then Problem C has a unique solution for unknown V and u¯0 and
V ∗0 (x) = V (x) = Vu¯0,u0(x),
where V ∗0 (x) is defined in (3.2). Thus the lump sum dividend barrier strategy piu¯0,u0 is an
optimal strategy in Π0. Also, for given u1 so that u
∗ < u0 < u1, for the corresponding optimal
upper barriers it holds that u¯∗ < u¯0 < u¯1.
According to Theorems 2.1 and 3.1, for a given lower barrier u0 the optimal strategy is the
lump sum barrier strategy piu˜,u1 where,
(u˜, u1) =

(u¯0, u0), if u0 > u
∗,
(u¯∗, u∗), if u0 ≤ u∗.
(3.3)
Here (u¯∗, u∗) is as in Theorem 2.1, while u¯0 is as in Theorem 3.1. This addresses the problem of
not being allowed to pay dividends that brings the capital too far down. The next result looks
at the other end. What if the company cannot make a dividend payment when it wants, but
has to postpone it until capital reaches a higher level? Let u¯1 > u˜ and let Π1 be the set of all
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admissible policies satisfying ∑
0≤τpin≤τpi
1{Xτpin+<u1∪Xτpin<u¯1} = 0, (3.4)
i.e. all policies so that paying dividends when capital is less than u¯1 as well as reducing it below
u1 through a dividend payment are ruled out. Define the new optimal return function V
∗
1 (x) as
V ∗1 (x) = sup
pi∈Π1
Vpi(x). (3.5)
Consider the problem for unknown V .
D: LV (x) = 0, 0 < x < u¯1,
V (0) = 0,
V (x) = V (u1) + k(x− u1), x > u¯1.
We then have the following theorem. It is proved in the Appendix.
Theorem 3.2. Assume that A1-A4 hold and that limx→∞ g′(x) = ∞. Let u0 and u¯1 > u˜ be
given, where u˜ is defined in (3.3). Then Problem D has a unique solution for unknown V and
V ∗1 (x) = V (x) = Vu¯1,u1(x),
where V ∗1 (x) is defined in (3.5) and u1 in (3.3). Thus the lump sum dividend barrier strategy
piu¯1,u1 is an optimal strategy in Π1
The messages of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 is that if the optimal barriers are too small, it is
still optimal to use lump sum barrier strategies with the barriers as close to the optimal ones
as possible in some sense. Therefore, we should look for barrier strategies, but with barriers
sufficiently large to satisfy solvency requirements. This is the topic of Section 4.
4. Optimality under a solvency constraint
Having argued in Section 3 that barrier strategies are optimal also under reasonable constraints,
we will in this section show how optimal barriers can be found that satisfy a natural solvency
restriction. To describe this restriction, let T <∞ be a fixed time horizon and define the survival
probability as
φu¯,u(T, x) = Px(τ
piu¯,u > T ),
where as before Px means that X0 = x and piu¯,u is the lump sum dividend strategy with barriers
u¯ and u. For a given ruin tolerance ε we say that the strategy piu¯,u is solvency admissible if
φu¯,u(T, u) ≥ 1− ε. (4.1)
Note that φu¯,u(T, u) = φu¯,u(T, u¯). This means that for a solvency admissible strategy piu¯,u, at
the time of paying a dividend the probability of survival during the next time interval of length
T using the same strategy cannot be smaller than 1− ε.
Also note that even when case (iii) of Theorem 2.1 applies, in principle condition (4.1) may
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not hold for any δ-optimal dividend strategy. The reason for this is that u(u¯) may be bounded
as u¯ → ∞. The following result shows that even in case (iii) there will exist a δ-optimal
dividend strategy. It is proved in the appendix.
Theorem 4.1. Assume case (iii) of Theorem 2.1. Then for any b > 0 and u¯ > 0 there exists a
u˜(u¯) < u¯ satisfying u˜(u¯)→∞ as u¯→∞ so that
Vu¯,u˜(u¯)(x)→ V ∗(x) ∀x ∈ [0, b] as u¯→∞.
By this result we can choose a u so large that for any δ > 0 there is a δ-optimal lump sum
dividend barrier that satisfies the constraint (4.1). Consequently, from now on it is assumed
that limx→∞ g′(x) =∞ as in Remark 2.1.
As in [6] it can be proved that if there exists a C1,2((0, T )× (0, u¯)) function v that satisfies
vt(t, x) =
1
2
σ2(x)vxx(t, x) + µ(x)vx(t, x), (t, x) ∈ (0, T )× (0, u¯) (4.2)
with initial value
v(0, x) = 1, 0 ≤ x ≤ u¯ (4.3)
and boundary value for t > 0,
v(t, 0) = 0 and v(t, u¯) = v(t, u), (4.4)
then v(T, x) = φu¯,u(T, x) is the survival probability. Here vt means the partial derivative w.r.t.
t and so on. In fact it is well known, see e.g. [5], that under assumptions A1-A3 any solution of
(4.2) is C1,2((0, T )× (0, u¯)).
Let us discuss how the optimal solvency admissible strategy can be found. By definition, for
u > 0, clearly
φu¯2,u(T, x) > φu¯1,u(T, x), u¯2 > u¯1,
φu¯,u2(T, x) > φu¯,u1(T, x), u2 > u1.
Let φ(T, x) = Px(Xt > 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ]) be the survival probability when there is no control. If
φ(T, u) ≤ 1 − ε then u cannot be the lower barrier of a solvency admissible dividend strategy
since paying dividends surely increases the ruin probability. However, if φ(T, u) > 1 − ε then
for sufficiently large u¯, piu¯,u will be a solvency admissible strategy. The lower bound um for the
lower barrier in a solvency admissible strategy is therefore of interest, and it is given by
φ(T, um) = 1− ε.
It is easy to show that if there exists a C1,2((0, T )× (0,∞)) function w that satisfies
wt(t, x) =
1
2
σ2(x)wxx(t, x) + µ(x)wx(t, x), (t, x) ∈ (0, T )× (0,∞) (4.5)
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with initial value
w(0, x) = 1, 0 ≤ x ≤ ∞ (4.6)
and boundary value for t > 0,
w(t, 0) = 0 and lim
x→∞w(t, x) = 1, (4.7)
then w(T, x) = φ(T, x). Again, by A1-A3 any solution of (4.5) is C1,2((0, T )× (0,∞)).
We are now ready for the optimality algorithm. It is assumed that limx→∞ g′(x) =∞.
1. Calculate the optimal V ∗(x) with corresponding barriers u¯∗ and u∗.
2. Calculate φu¯∗,u∗(T, u
∗). If φu¯∗,u∗(T, u∗) ≥ 1− ε, the optimal strategy satisfies the solvency
constraint and we are done. If not continue to step 3.
3. Find um as the unique solution of φ(T, um) = 1 − ε. This can be done using a one
dimensional search.
4. Let δ > 0 be a small number, and set ui = um + iδ, i = 1, 2, . . ..
5. For each ui, find the corresponding optimal upper barrier by solving Problem C, and call
this ui. Calculate φui,ui(T, ui) and if φui,ui(T, ui) ≥ 1 − ε, set u¯i = ui. Also let c¯i be the
scaling factor so that the solution is V ∗0 (x) = c¯ig(x) for x ≤ u¯i. On the other hand, if
φui,ui(T, ui) < 1− ε, increase ui in steps of δ until the solvency constraint is satisfied. Let
u¯i be the corresponding upper barrier and c¯i the scaling factor found by solving Problem
D.
6. Do this until c¯i falls significantly. Then let cε be the highest c¯i and u¯ε and uε be the
corresponding u¯i and ui respectively. The optimal solvency admissible strategy is then
piu¯ε,uε and the corresponding value function is
Vε(x) =
{
cεg(x), 0 ≤ x ≤ u¯ε,
Vε(u¯ε) + k(x− u¯ε), x > u¯ε.
The equations (4.2) and (4.5) together with their respective initial and boundary conditions
are not easily solvable, but taking the Laplace transform brings them into ordinary differential
equations. To see how, consider (4.2) and define
v˜(s, x) = Lv(s) =
∫ ∞
0
e−stv(t, x)dt.
Straightforward calculations, using (4.3), gives that v˜ satisfies
1
2
σ2(x)v˜xx(s, x) + µ(x)v˜x(s, x)− sv˜(s, x) = −1. (4.8)
A particular solution is given by v˜p(s, x) = s
−1. Let v˜1(s, x) and v˜2(s, x) be independent solutions
of the homogeneous equation in (4.8). Then we have
v˜(s, x) = a1(s)v˜1(s, x) + a2(s)v˜2(s, x) +
1
s
,
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where a1 and a2 are determined from the initial and boundary conditions. Now v(t, 0) = 0
implies that v˜(s, 0) = 0 as well, and v(t, u¯) = v(t, u) implies that v˜(s, u¯) = v˜(s, u). Therefore,
after some straightforward calculations
a1(s) =
1
s
v˜2(s, u¯)− v˜2(s, u)
v˜2(s, 0)(v˜1(s, u¯)− v˜1(s, u))− v˜1(s, 0)(v˜2(s, u¯)− v˜2(s, u)) (4.9)
a2(s) = −1
s
v˜1(s, u¯)− v˜1(s, u)
v˜2(s, 0)(v˜1(s, u¯)− v˜1(s, u))− v˜1(s, 0)(v˜2(s, u¯)− v˜2(s, u)) (4.10)
Let L−1h (t) be the inverse Laplace transform. Then Ls−1(t) = 1 and using the Laplace transform
property for integrals, we get that
v(T, x) = 1−
∫ T
0
L−1h1+h2(t)dt,
where
hi(s, x) = −sai(s)v˜i(s, x), i = 1, 2.
Therefore, P (τpi ∈ dt) = L−1h1+h2(t)dt when pi = piu¯,u.
Similarly, w˜(s, x) = Lw(s) also satisfies (4.8) with w˜(s, 0) = 0 and limx→∞ w˜(s, x) = s−1.
Therefore, if we let w˜1(s, x) and w˜2(s, x) be two independent solutions of the homogeneous
equation, and assume that wˆi(s) = limx→∞ w˜i(s, x), i = 1, 2 exist, then
w˜(s, x) = b1(s)w˜1(s, x) + b2(s)w˜2(s, x) +
1
s
,
where
b1(s) =
1
s
1
w˜2(s, 0)
wˆ1(s)
wˆ2(s)
− w˜1(s, 0)
,
b2(s) =
1
s
1
w˜1(s, 0)
wˆ2(s)
wˆ1(s)
− w˜2(s, 0)
.
Inversion formulas are similar to those above.
Example 4.1 Assume that µ and σ2 are constants. Then it is easy to see that
v˜i(s, x) = w˜i(s, x) = e
ci(s)x, i = 1, 2,
where
c1(s) = − µ
σ2
+
√
µ2
σ4
+
2s
σ2
> 0 and c2(s) = − µ
σ2
−
√
µ2
σ4
+
2s
σ2
< 0.
Plugging this into (4.9) and (4.10) gives v˜(s, x). Inverting this Laplace transform is unfortunately
not straightforward.
Also wˆ1(s) =∞ and wˆ2(s) = 0, hence b1(s) = 0 and b2(s) = −s−1. Therefore,
w˜(s, x) =
1
s
− 1
s
ec2(s)x.
This can be inverted using standard tables for the Laplace transform. However, the solution
can also be obtained by other methods, see e.g. [3] p.196, and is given by
w(T, x) = 1− 1√
2pi
x
σ
∫ T
0
t−
3
2 e−
(x+µt)2
2σ2t dt.
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Therefore, um is given as the unique solution of (in x)
x =
√
2piσε∫ T
0 t
− 3
2 e−
(x+µt)2
2σ2t dt
.
5. Numerical Solutions
In order to provide a complete numerical solution to the problem, several differential equations,
both ordinary and partial, have to be solved.
For problems B, C and D it is necessary to find a canonical solution g, either analytically,
or if that is not possible or practical, numerically. In the latter case, the Runge-Kutta method
can be used, together with linear interpolation between the grid points, this for g, g′ and g′′. In
case the assumption of Proposition 2.1 does not hold, the numerical solution can be helpful to
assess whether limx→∞ g′(x) =∞ or not.
Problems B1+B2 or B1+B3. In [7] it is shown how this can be reduced to a one dimensional
search problem, but for completeness and since the notation is somewhat different, we include
it here. This method will also reveal whether an optimal solution exists.
1. Find the x∗ ∈ (0,∞), if it exists, so that g′′(x∗) = 0. If g is convex, we set x∗ = 0, and if
it is concave we set x∗ =∞. In the second case there is no solution, and by Lemma A.2b,
x∗ = 0 is equivalent to µ(0) ≤ 0, so this case is easy to establish.
2. Choose x < x∗ and let c = kg′(x) so that cg
′(x) = k.
3. Find (if possible) a y > x∗ so that g′(y) = kc . If this is not possible, try with a larger x
until it is satisfied.
4. Calculate k(y−x)− c(g(y)− g(x)). If this is larger than K increase x. Otherwise decrease
x.
5. Repeat the process until a solution is obtained, or until it is clear that there is no solution.
In case there is a solution, upon convergence u∗ = x, u¯∗ = y and V ∗(x) = cg(x) for x ≤ u¯∗.
Problem C. Assume it is clear that limx→∞ g′(x) =∞. Then the following easy recipe works:
1. Choose an x > u0 and let c =
k
g′(x) so that cg
′(x) = k.
2. Calculate k(x−u0)−c(g(x)−g(u0)). If this is larger than K decrease x, otherwise increase
x.
3. Repeat the process until convergence is obtained. Upon convergence, u¯0 = x and V (x) =
cg(x) for x ≤ u¯0.
Problem D. The unique solution is given in (A.15) in the appendix.
The function v(t, x) of (4.2)-(4.4). This is a standard PDE, but with nonstandard boundary
conditions. It turns out that the Crank-Nicolson algorithm together with an adaption of the
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Thomas algorithm to solve tridiagonal systems are well suited for this problem. For more details
on the Crank-Nicolson and the Thomas algorithms the reader can consult [1].
To explain how this adaption works, let h be the grid length and ih, i = 0, 1, . . . ,m the
gridpoints so that mh = u¯. Similarly, let k be the grid length and jk, j = 0, 1, . . . , n the
gridpoints so that nk = T Previously k is defined as the tax rate, but there should be no
ambiguity so we follow the standard notation. Let σ2i = σ
2(ih) and µi = µ(ih), i = 0, 1, . . . ,m.
With vji an approximation to v(ih, jk), the Crank-Nicolson finite difference scheme is
1
k
(vj+1i − vji ) =
1
4h2
[
σ2i
(
vj+1i+1 − 2vj+1i + vj+1i−1 + vji+1 − 2vji + vji−1
)
+µih
(
vj+1i+1 − vj+1i−1 + vji+1 − vji−1
)]
.
Collecting terms, this can be written as
αiv
j+1
i−1 + βiv
j+1
i + γiv
j+1
i+1 = d
j
i , (5.1)
where with r = k
h2
,
αi = −r
4
(
σ2i − µih
)
,
βi = 1 +
1
2
rσ2i ,
γi = −r
4
(
σ2i + µih
)
,
dji = −αivji−1 + (1−
1
2
rσ2i )v
j
i − γivji+1.
To start the iterations we use the intial value v(0, x) = 1 giving v0i = 1 as well, and so the d
0
i ,
i = 0, 1, . . . ,m can be calculated.
Now to the Thomas algorithm. To use it, for numerical stability we should have
|αi|+ |γi| < |βi|, i = 0, 1, . . . ,m. (5.2)
Let us check this condition:
1. σ2i ≥ µih. Then |αi|+ |γi| = 12rσ2i < βi, so this case is unproblematic.
2. σ2i < µih. Then |αi|+ |γi| = 12rµih < βi if and only if r < 2µih−σ2i .
In order to have case 1 at all gridpoints, we can let
h ≤ max
i
σ2i
µi
,
and then for good convergence, a typical choice of r is r = 12 .
Assume that (5.2) is satisfied, and for simplicity write vi = v
j+1
i and di = d
j
i in (5.1). The
idea of the Thomas algorithm is to write
vi = pi+1vi+1 + qi+1 (5.3)
for unknown pi+1 and qi+1. Using this in (5.1) with i− 1 instead of i, we get
αi(pivi + qi) + βivi + γivi+1 = di. (5.4)
12
Comparing (5.3) and (5.4) gives
pi+1 = − γi
αipi + βi
and qi+1 =
di − αiqi
αipi + βi
. (5.5)
The boundary condition v(t, 0) = 0 implies that 0 = v0 = p1v1 + q1, which is satisfied if
p1 = q1 = 0. We can now use (5.5) to recursively calculate (pi, qi), i = 2, . . . ,m. Then using
(5.3) backwards yields
vm =
vm−1 − qm
pm
=
1
pm
(
vm−2 − qm−1
pm−1
− qm
)
= · · ·
=
1
Pml+1
vl −
m∑
i=l+1
qi
Pmi
,
where
Pmi =
m∏
j=i
pj .
The boundary condition v(t, u¯) = v(t, u) implies that vm = vl where hl = u. Therefore,
vm = −
∑m
i=l+1
qi
Pmi
1− 1Pml+1
=
ql+1 +
∑m
i=l+2 P
i−1
l+1 qi
1− Pml+1
.
We can now go backwards using (5.3) again.
Remark 5.1 Since in the Crank-Nicolson method k = rh2, the space grid is typically much
coarser than the time grid. In our problem we are searching for optimal points in the space
variable, and therefore a fully implicit scheme with k = rh for some r may be more suitable,
since this allows for a finer space grid with the same computation time. The relation (5.1) will
still apply, but with different coefficients, and so the Thomas algorithm is again applicable.
However, we have not tried this method.
The function w(t, x) of (4.5)-(4.7). This is basically the same problem as that discussed
above, except that instead of the nonstandard boundary condition v(t, u¯) = v(t, u), we impose
the standard boundary condition w(t, u¯) = 1 for some large u¯. This will result in a slightly
overestimate of the survival probability, but if u¯ is chosen large enough, it should not be a real
problem. Deciding when u¯ is large enough is not an obvious task, but one way may be to keep
x fixed at a moderate value, and then try with increasing u¯ until the solution w(0, x) stabilizes.
Given the u¯, the Crank-Nicolson algorithm together with the standard Thomas algorithm
should work fine. Also, to find w analytically is easier than to find v, as we saw in Example 4.1.
6. Numerical examples
In this section we will give two numerical examples where optimal solutions with and without
the solvency constraint are compared. In all plots, solid lines are for the case with the solvency
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constraint, while dashed lines are without solvency constraints. Each figure is split into three
panels, where the first panel shows the optimal upper and lower barriers, both without and with
the solvency constraint. The second panel shows the amount of dividends paid each time, i.e.
u¯ε − uε and u¯∗ − u∗. The third panel shows the constants cε and c∗ so that the value functions
equal Vε(x) = cεg(x), x ≤ u¯ε and V ∗(x) = c∗g(x), x ≤ u¯∗, where g is a canonical solution to
be specified in each example. This means that for x ≤ u¯∗, 1− cεc∗ is the percentage loss of value
due to the solvency constraint.
Before we give the examples, a few words on the numerics. All programs were written in
R, but with subprograms in C for the number crunching. The simple algorithm described in
Section 4 had to be modified. The reason is that the finite difference scheme (5.1) for solving
(4.2) is accurate of order 2. However, a perturbation of size h of the boundary condition of a
PDE will in general induce a change in the solution of order O(h). Experimentally this seems
to be the case also in this case for perturbations of u¯ and u, i.e. the most accurate numerical
evaluations of the survival probability φu¯,u for a given lump sum strategy piu¯,u seem to come
when u and u¯ are both nodes on the PDE grid. This is especially true for u. The general idea
behind the program is therefore to minimize the calculations of off-grid u and u¯ by defining the
grids so that u is on the grid. To find the smallest solvency admissible u¯ for a fixed u > um, the
program iterates as follows:
1. Start with a fairly coarse grid and find two adjacent points v¯1 < w¯1 so that according to
the numerical solution piw¯1,u is solvency admissible, while piv¯1,u is not. Then one iteration
of the secant method is used to find a u¯1 between v¯1 and w¯1.
2. Repeat the procedure with a finer grid, and find adjacent points v¯2 < w¯2 with the same
properties as v¯1 and w¯1. Since the grid has changed, so has the numerical solution of the
ruin probability, and frequently this resulted in v¯2 > w¯1.
3. Repeat the process a certain number of times. We repeated it until there was about 100
million nodes, where we used k = 12h
2.
Although a bit circumstantial, this routine was in fact quite efficient in terms of total running
time. As is seen from several of the figures below, the upper estimated values of u¯ are sometimes
quite erratic. However, this does not matter much since the corresponding values of cε do not
vary much. When comparing different plots it is important to note that the y-axis varies, and
when the span on the y-axis is very small the results may look more erratic than they actually are.
Example 6.1 Let µ(x) = µ and σ(x) = σ be constants, so that (2.1) becomes
Xt = x+ µt+ σWt.
By Proposition 2.1, limx→∞ g′(x) =∞, hence an optimal strategy always exists.
In Figures 1-5 µ = σ = 1 and the canonical solution chosen is
g(x) = αe−θx sinh(βx)
with α = 0.9636 (a bit arbitrary, admittedly) and
θ =
µ
σ2
and β =
1
σ2
√
2λσ2 + µ2.
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The other parameter values used are
λ = 0.1, T = 10, k = 0.95, K = 0.05, ε = 0.01.
In the figures 4 of these are kept fixed, while one is varying. In the discussion below, u¯ is generic
for both the unconstrained upper barrier u¯∗ and the constrained u¯ε, and similar with u.
In Figure 1, the discounting factor λ is varied. When there is no solvency constraint, we see
from the first panel that both upper and lower barriers decrease as λ increases, which reflects
the fact that with large values of λ early payments are important, since later payments are
heavily discounted. When λ is small, the solvency constraint is not binding due to the long term
perspective, and hence the necessity to avoid early ruin provides sufficiently large barriers. As
λ increases, the constraint becomes binding, and the lower barrier even increases. The reason
for this is that with a given constraint, there is more to gain by decreasing the upper barrier
u¯ε a lot, even if that means a small increase in the lower barrier uε. However, it is interesting
to see from the middle panel that the actual payout u¯− u is not much affected by the solvency
constraint. From the right panel, we see that the relative impact of the solvency constraint on
the values c∗ and cε increases quite a lot with λ, but for moderate values of λ it only causes
small reductions in the value of the company.
In Figure 2 the time horizon T varies. Without the solvency constraint, the optimal solution
is independent of T , which is also seen from the figure. For small T , the optimal solution
gives sufficiently high survivial probability, hence the solvency constraint is not binding. As T
increases, with the solvency constraint both the lower and upper barriers increase, but it is seen
from the middle panel that the actual payout is again not much affected by the constraint. Why
the payout first goes down and then increases we cannot explain. The ruggednes of the graph
in the middle panel is due to numerical issues as discussed above. However, looking at the scale
on the y-axis, we see that the variations are not severe. From the right panel it is seen that
although the barriers are much influenced by the solvency constraint, the actual values cε are
far less so.
In Figure 3 the retention rate k varies. As k increases, the amount received, k(u¯− u)−K,
gets positive for lower amounts u¯ − u paid, and so both barriers decrease with k, both in the
unconstrained and the constrained case. The effect of the solvency constraint is just to increase
the barriers, but from the middle panel we see that again the payout u¯−u is not much affected.
From the right panel it is seen that the actual value of the company is not much affected neither.
In Figure 4 the fixed cost K is varied. Since for K large, the payout u¯− u must be large in
order for the dividend received, k(u¯− u)−K, to be positive, the optimal payout must increase
with K, which is confirmed in the middle panel. For the rest, the picture is much the same as
before, with the solvency constrained barriers lying above those without the solvency constraint,
but with the payout u¯ − u rather unaffected. Also, as seen from the right panel, the solvency
constraint does not reduce the value of the company by very much.
Finally, in Figure 5 the ruin tolerance ε varies. For sufficient large values of ε the solvency
constraint is not binding, but as soon as the constraint becomes binding (read the x-axis from
right to left), the picture is much the same as before with both lower and upper barriers increased
due to the solvency constraint, but with payouts u¯−u almost the same, and values cε moderately
lower than the optimal c∗. When the solvency constraint is binding, the somewhat rugged
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behaviour of the curves in the first two panels is again due to numerical issues, but it is seen
from the right panel that the optimal values cε is not much influenced, hence these numerical
issues are rather unproblematic.
The tentative conclusion we can draw from this example is that the solvency constraint can
have a quite large impact on the optimal barriers, but except in rather extreme cases, the impact
on the actual payout u¯ − u as well as on the value cε versus c∗, is much more modest. This is
good news for the shareholders, since what counts for them is how much smaller cε is than c
∗,
i.e. their ”loss” due to the solvency constraint.
Figure 6 shows the values of Vε(x) and V
∗(x) for the standard parameter choice. This gave
(u¯ε, uε) = (4.65, 3.13) and (u¯
∗, u∗) = (3.81, 2.22). Not so easy to see from the figure, but V ∗(x)
is concave up to x = 2.82 and then convex. As of Vε(x) it is also concave up to x = 2.82, and
then convex up to u¯ε. However, V
′
ε (u¯ε−) = 0.978 > V ′ε (u¯ε+) = k = 0.95, and so Vε is not
convex from x = 2.82. That V ′ε (u¯ε−) ≥ V ′ε (u¯ε+) is a general fact, proved in Lemma A.6 in the
appendix.
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Figure 1: Values for varying λ in Example 6.1. The other values are kept fixed at T = 10, k =
0.95, K = 0.05, ε = 0.01.
Example 6.2 Let the basic income process follow the linear Brownian motion
Pt = x+ µt+ σPWP,t,
and assume that assets are invested in a risky investment so that the dynamics of the noncon-
trolled process is
dXt = dPt +XtdRt.
We assume that R is a Black-Scholes investment generating process, i.e. Rt = (λ−α)t+σRWR,t,
and that WP and WR are independent. Here λ can be seen as the market rate, also used for
discounting, while α is a proportional cost associated with the investment.
We can write X as (same weak solution)
dXt = (µ+ (λ− α)Xt)dt+
√
σ2P + σ
2
RX
2
t dWt,
where W is a Brownian motion.
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Figure 2: Values for varying T in Example 6.1. The other values are kept fixed at λ = 0.1, k =
0.95, K = 0.05, ε = 0.01.
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Figure 3: Values for varying k in Example 6.1. The other values are kept fixed at λ = 0.1, T =
10, K = 0.05, ε = 0.01.
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Figure 4: Values for varying K in Example 6.1. The other values are kept fixed at λ = 0.1, T =
10, k = 0.95, ε = 0.01.
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Figure 5: Values for varying ε in Example 6.1. The other values are kept fixed at λ = 0.1, T =
10, k = 0.95, K = 0.05.
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Figure 6: Values of Vε(x) and V
∗(x) for varying x in Example 6.1. The parameters are λ =
0.1, T = 10, k = 0.95, K = 0.05, ε = 0.01.
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By Proposition 2.1, limx→∞ g′(x) = ∞, hence an optimal strategy exists when α > 0.
Actually, using arguments similar to those in Section 3 in [7] together with the solutions given
in the appendix in [9], it can be proved that an optimal strategy exists if and only if α > 0. Again
using the solutions in that appendix, a canonical solution can be found, but it is complicated
so we used the more convenient Runge Kutta method to obtain a numerical solution of g(x),
scaled so that g′(0) = 1.
In Figures 7-12 µ = σP = 1, σR = 0.25 and α = 0.02. The other parameters used are the
same as in Example 6.1, and in the figures 5 of these are kept fixed, while one is varying.
In Figure 7 the discounting factor λ is varied. This is a somewhat different situation from
that in Figure 1. Ignoring the random elements, in Example 1 the only income is the linear µ,
which is heavily deflated with an increasing λ. In this example there is in addition an investment
income λ − α, which is exponential in nature and therefore partially offsets an increase in λ.
When λ is small, the linear income µ dominates, but as λ increases the exponential investment
income takes over. This can explain the middle panel in Figure 7, where for small λ the payout
decreases with λ as in Figure 1, but as λ increases it starts to increase again. From the left
panel we see that the upper barrier starts to increase when λ gets big both in the unconstrained
and in the constrained case. However, from the right panel it is seen that the overall effect of
increasing λ is somewhat smaller in Figure 7 than in Figure 1, which is to be expected.
Figures 8-11 do not differ very much from Figures 2-5, except that the effect of the solvency
constraint seems even less serious here. In Figures 8 and 11 (as well as in Figure 7), the
solvency constraint caused some ruggedness due to numerical issues, but again looking at the
corresponding right panels shows that this is of no importance.
In Figure 12, the effect of varying the cost factor α is shown. With small α, the investment
return λ−α is almost as large as the discounting factor λ, and therefore there is no urgency to pay
out dividends, hence the barriers can be set high, and the solvency constraint is not binding.
As α increases, it is more urgent to pay dividends, and therefore the optimal unconstrained
barriers will not satisfy the solvency constraint. Again the payouts u¯− u are almost unaffected
by the solvency constraint, and from the right panel we see that the reduction in value due to
the solvency constraint is not very large.
The conclusion here is much the same as in Example 6.1, the solvency constraint can have
a fairly large impact on the optimal policy, but the actual payout as well as the value of the
company are only moderately affected.
We also tried with an ”investment risk free” version, i.e. with σR = 0 so that
dXt = (µ+ (λ− α)Xt)dt+ σdWt.
However, this gave much the same results, indicating the the results are quite robust.
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Figure 7: Values for varying λ in Example 6.2. The other values are kept fixed at T = 10, k =
0.95, K = 0.05, ε = 0.01.
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Figure 8: Values for varying T in Example 6.2. The other values are kept fixed at λ = 0.1, k =
0.95, K = 0.05, ε = 0.01.
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Figure 9: Values for varying k in Example 6.2. The other values are kept fixed at λ = 0.1, T =
10, K = 0.05, ε = 0.01.
20
0 0.5 1
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Values of K
Upp
er a
nd l
owe
r op
tima
l ba
rrier
s
0 0.5 1
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Values of K
Opti
mal 
divid
end
 pay
out
0 0.5 1
16.8
17
17.2
17.4
17.6
17.8
18
18.2
18.4
18.6
18.8
Values of K
Valu
es o
f c ε 
and
 c*
Figure 10: Values for varying K in Example 6.2. The other values are kept fixed at λ =
0.1, T = 10, k = 0.95, ε = 0.01.
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Figure 11: Values for varying ε in Example 6.2. The other values are kept fixed at λ = 0.1, T =
10, k = 0.95, K = 0.05.
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Figure 12: Values for varying α in Example 6.2. The other values are kept fixed at λ = 0.1, T =
10, k = 0.95, K = 0.05.
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Appendix
In this appendix we will prove Proposition 2.1, Theorems 3.1-3.2 and Theorem 4.1. To do so
we need the following lemmas, which are the same as Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 in [7].
Lemma A.1 Let µ(x) and σ(x) satisfy A2 − A4 and let f be a solution of Lf(x) = 0.
Consider the interval [0,∞).
a) If f has a zero on [0,∞), then f ′ has no zero on [0,∞).
b) If for some x˜ ∈ [0,∞), f ′(x˜) > 0 and f ′′(x˜) ≤ 0, then f is a concave function on [0, x˜).
Lemma A.2 Let µ(x) and σ(x) satisfy A2 − A4 and let f satisfy Lf(x) = 0, f(0) = 0 and
f(xˆ) > 0 for some xˆ > 0.
a) f is strongly increasing.
b) There is an x∗ ≥ 0 (possibly taking the value infinity) so that f is concave on (0, x∗) and
convex on (x∗,∞). In particular x∗ = 0 if and only if µ(0) ≤ 0 and trivially f ′′(x∗) = 0 when
0 < x∗ <∞.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. To keep initial conditions fixed, we restrict the definition of a
canonical solution to mean that g(0) = 0 and g′(0) = 1. First note that for any δ > 0,
µ(x) < µ(0) + λx0 + δ + (λ− ε)x,
and therefore it follows from Lemma 2.3 in [7] that it is sufficient to prove that for any a, a
canonical solution of
1
2
σ2(x)f ′′(x) + (a+ (λ− ε)x)f ′(x)− λf(x) = 0,
satisfies limx→∞ f ′(x) =∞.
By Lemma A.2b, such a canonical solution f is either ultimately convex or ultimately con-
cave. In either case there exists a c ≤ ∞ so that
lim
x→∞ f
′(x) = c and lim
x→∞
f(x)
x
= c.
Assume that c <∞. Then, since
f ′(x) = 1 +
∫ x
0
f ′′(y)dy,
there must exist a sequence {xn} with xn →∞ as n→∞ so that f ′′(xn) = o(x−1n ). Also
1
2
σ2(x)
x
f ′′(x) = −a+ (λ− ε)x
x
f ′(x) + λ
f(x)
x
→ εc as x→∞.
Then, considering only the leading terms,
σ2(xn)
x2n
∼ 2εc
xno(x
−1
n )
→∞ as n→∞.
But this contradicts A1, hence c =∞ and we are done. 
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The next step is to prove that Problem C really has a solution.
Lemma A.3 Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.1, Problem C has exactly one solution and
u¯0 > x
∗, where x∗ is given in Lemma A.2.
Proof. We are looking for a solution (c¯, u¯0) of
c¯g′(u¯0) = k, (A.1)
c¯g(u¯0) = c¯g(u0) + k(u¯0 − u0)−K. (A.2)
Let
cˆ =

k
g′(x∗) , u0 ≤ x∗,
k
g′(u0)
, u0 > x
∗,
For given c > 0, consider the equation
cg′(uc) = k for some uc ≥ max{u0, x∗}. (A.3)
If u0 ≤ x∗, since g′(x) is increasing on [x∗,∞), it is easy to see that (A.3) has a solution if and
only if c ≤ cˆ. A similar argument shows that this holds when u0 > x∗ as well. We can therefore
define the function
I(c) =
∫ uc
u0
(k − cg′(y))dy, 0 < c ≤ cˆ.
Then (A.1) and (A.2) are equivalent with the existence of a c so that I(c) = K. By the implicit
function theorem, uc is continuously differentiable w.r.t. c and I
′(c) = − ∫ ucu0 g′(y)dy < 0, i.e. I
is continuous and strictly decreasing in c ∈ (0, cˆ). Also limc→0 uc = ∞, hence limc→0 I(c) = ∞
as well. Therefore, if we can prove that I(cˆ) ≤ 0, there must exist a unique c¯ ∈ (0, cˆ) so that
I(c¯) = K.
To prove that I(cˆ) ≤ 0, assume first that u0 ≤ x∗. Then since g′ has a minimum at x∗,
cˆg′(x) =
g′(x)
g′(x∗)
k ≥ k,
and consequently I(cˆ) ≤ 0. If u0 > x∗, then g′ is increasing on [u0,∞), hence cˆg′(x) ≥ k for
x ∈ [u0,∞), and so I(cˆ) ≤ 0 again.
Denoting the corresponding uc¯ by u¯0 so that c¯g
′(u¯0) = k we can thus conclude that
V (x) =

c¯g(x), 0 ≤ x ≤ u¯0,
V (u¯0) + k(x− u¯0), x > u¯0.

Lemma A.4 Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.1, let V be as in Lemma A.3. Then
V ′(x) < k for x ∈ [u0, u¯0).
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Proof. By Lemma A.2, it is sufficient to prove that V ′(u0) < k. If u0 ≥ x∗ the result is trivially
true by convexity of g on [x∗,∞). Assume therefore that u0 < x∗ and let V ∗(x) = c∗g(x) be
the optimal solution from Theorem 2.1. Assume that c¯ ≥ c∗. Then since c∗g′(u¯∗) = c¯g′(u¯0) it is
necessary that u¯0 ≤ u¯∗. But then
K =
∫ u¯0
u0
(k − c¯g′(x))dx ≤
∫ u¯0
u0
(k − c∗g′(x))dx <
∫ u¯∗
u∗
(k − c∗g′(x))dx = K,
a contradiction. Therefore, c¯ < c∗ and by concavity of g on [u∗, x∗],
V ′(u0) = c¯g
′(u0) < c
∗g′(u0) < c
∗g′(u∗) = k.

For a function φ : [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞) define the maximum utility operator M by
Mφ(x) :=

sup{φ(x− η)−K + kη : 0 ≤ η ≤ x− u0}, if x ∈ [u0,∞),
−∞, if x ∈ [0, u0).
(A.4)
Lemma A.5. Let V be as in Lemma A.3. Then V satisfies the quasi-variational inequalities
LV (x) ≤ 0, (A.5)
V (x) ≥MV (x), (A.6)
(V (x)−MV (x))(LV (x)) = 0, (A.7)
V (0) = 0. (A.8)
Furthermore, MV (x) < V (x) when x ∈ [0, u¯0) and MV (x) = V (x) when x ∈ [u¯0,∞).
Proof. We first prove (A.5). Since LV (x) = 0 when x ≤ u¯0, assume that x > u¯0. Since
by Lemma A.3, u¯0 > x
∗, V ′′(u¯0−) > 0 while trivially V ′′(u¯0+) = 0. Using that V (x) =
V (u¯0) + k(x− u¯0) we get by Assumption A4,
LV (x) = µ(x)k − λ(V (u¯0) + k(x− u¯0))
= k
∫ x
u¯0
(µ′(y)− λ)dy + kµ(u¯0)− λV (u¯0)
≤ kµ(u¯0)− λV (u¯0)
≤ 1
2
σ2(u¯0−)V ′′(u¯0−) + µ(u¯0−)V ′(u¯0−)− λV (u¯0−) = 0.
We proceed to prove (A.6). For x ∈ [0, u0], MV (x) = −∞, hence the inequality is trivially
satisfied. When x > u0, by Lemma A4 and the definition of V (x), V
′(x) < k when x ∈ [u0, u¯0),
and V ′(x) = k when x ∈ [u¯0,∞). Therefore the function V (x − η) + kη −K is increasing in η
for nonnegative η and takes its maximum when η = x− u0. Hence, for x ∈ [u0, u¯0),
MV (x)−V (x) = V (u0)+k(x−u0)−K−V (x) =
∫ x
u0
(k−V ′(y))dy−K <
∫ u¯0
u0
(k−V ′(y))dy−K = 0.
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For x ≥ u¯0 we have
MV (x) = V (u0) + k(x− u0)−K = V (x).
This also proves (A.7) since LV (x) = 0 for x ∈ (0, u¯0) and MV (x) = V (x) for x ∈ [u¯0,∞).
Finally (A.8) follows by definition of V . 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let pi ∈ Π0 be an arbitrary strategy. By definition, V is continuously
differentiable on (0,∞) and twice continuously differentiable on (0, u¯0) ∪ (u¯0,∞). However, for
x = u¯0, the continuity of V
′′ might fail. Since {0 ≤ t < τpi : Xpit = u¯0} has Lebesgue measure
zero under each Px, we can use Itoˆ’s formula, see e.g. [2] p.460, together with (A.5) to get
e−λ(t∧τ
pi)V (Xpit∧τpi+) = V (x) +
∫ t∧τpi
0
e−λsL(Xpis )ds
+
∫ t∧τpi
0
e−λsσ(Xpis )V
′(Xpis )dWs +
∑
0≤τpin≤t∧τpi
e−λτ
pi
n
(
V (Xpiτpin+)− V (Xpiτpin )
)
(A.9)
≤ V (x) +
∫ t∧τpi
0
e−λsσ(Xpis )V
′(Xpis )dWs +
∑
0≤τpin≤t∧τpi
e−λτ
pi
n
(
V (Xpiτpin+)− V (Xpiτpin )
)
.
Here we can let V ′′(u¯0) = V
′′−(u¯0). Another argument for this formula would be to use Lemma
A.8 below where now k = k1.
Since V ′ is bounded and the process satisfies Assumptions A1-A4, it is fairly straightforward
to show that ∫ t∧τpi
0
e−λsσ(Xpis )V
′(Xpis )dWs
is a martingale. Taking expectations on both sides of (A.9) therefore yields
Ex
[
e−λ(t∧τ
pi)V (Xpit∧τpi+)
]
≤ V (x) + Ex
 ∑
0≤τpin≤t∧τpi
e−λτ
pi
n
(
V (Xpiτpin+)− V (Xpiτpin )
) . (A.10)
From (A.6) and the fact that Xpiτpin > X
pi
τpin+
≥ u0, it follows that
e−λτ
pi
n
(
V (Xpiτpin+)− V (Xpiτpin )
)
≤ −e−λτpin (kξpin −K), n = 1, 2, · · · . (A.11)
on {τpin ≤ t ∧ τpi}. Then (A.10) and (A.11) together give
0 ≤ V (x)− Ex
[ ∞∑
n=1
e−λτ
pi
n (kξpin −K)1{τpin≤t∧τpi}
]
− Ex
[
e−λ(t∧τ
pi)V (Xpit∧τpi+)
]
. (A.12)
Letting t→∞ in (A.12), we have by nonnegativity of V ,
V (x) ≥ Ex
[ ∞∑
n=1
e−λτ
pi
n (kξpin −K)1{τpin≤τpi}
]
= Vpi(x), (A.13)
which implies that V (x) ≥ V ∗0 (x).
Now consider the lump sum dividend barrier strategy piu¯0,u0 given in Theorem 3.1. Since
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Xpi0s does not exceed u¯0, L(Xpi0s ) = 0 a.s. for 0 < s < τpi0 . Therefore, the inequality in (A.9)
becomes an equality with the strategy pi0, i.e.
e−λ(t∧τ
pi0 )V (Xpi0t∧τpi0+) = V (x) +
∫ t∧τpi0
0
e−λsσ(Xpi0s )V
′(Xpi0s )dWs
+
∑
0≤τpi0n ≤t∧τpi0
e−λτ
pi0
n
(
V (Xpi0
τ
pi0
n +
)− V (Xpi0
τ
pi0
n
)
)
. (A.14)
Assume that x = X0 ≥ u¯0. Then
V (x) = MV (x) = V (u0) + k(x− u0)−K, x ≥ u¯0,
and
ξpi01 = x− u0, ξpi0n = u¯0 − u0, n = 2, 3, · · · .
We can conclude that
V (Xpi0
τ
pi0
1 +
)− V (Xpi0
τ
pi0
1
) = V (Xpi0
τ
pi0
1
− ξpi01 )− V (Xpi0τpi01 ) = −kξ
pi0
1 +K,
and
V (Xpi0
τ
pi0
n +
)− V (Xpi0
τ
pi0
n
) = −kξpi0n +K, n = 2, 3, · · · .
Also by boundedness of Xpi0t∧τpi0+ and the fact that P (τ
pi0 < ∞) = 1 and Xpi0τpi0+ = 0, it follows
from the bounded convergence theorem that
lim
t→∞Ex
[
e−λ(t∧τ
pi0 )V (Xpi0t∧τpi0+)
]
= 0.
Therefore, taking expectations in (A.14) and then letting t→∞ gives
V (x) = Vu¯0,u0(x),
which implies that V (x) ≤ V ∗0 (x). In summary, we get V (x) = V ∗0 (x) = Vu¯0,u0(x).
When the initial reserve X0− = x < u¯0, the result is proved similarly.
To prove the last part of the theorem, let u∗ ≤ u0 < u1, and let Vi(x) = Vu¯i,ui(x) be
the two value functions. Write Vi(x) = c¯ig(x) for x ∈ [0, u¯i]. By what we have just proved,
V0(x) > V1(x), hence c¯0 > c¯1. Therefore, for V
′
i (u¯i) = k it is necessary that u¯1 > u¯0. 
Now to the proof of Theorem 3.2. To prove that there is exactly one solution to the equations
in Assumption D, just let V (x) = c¯g(x) so that we get the equation
c¯g(u¯1) = c¯g(u1) + k(u¯1 − u1)−K.
Solving for c¯ gives
V (x) =

k(u¯1−u1)−K
g(u¯1)−g(u1) g(x), 0 ≤ x ≤ u¯1,
V (u¯1) + k(x− u¯1), x > u¯1.
(A.15)
Lemma A.6. Let V be the solution of Problem D. Then there is a uˆ ∈ [u1, u¯1] so that
V ′(x) ≤ k on [u1, uˆ] and V ′(x) ≥ k on [uˆ, u¯1].
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Proof Since u˜ is an upper optimality point, see (3.3) and what follows there, by the previous
analysis we know that the corresponding value function is
V ∗0 (x) =

k g(x)g′(u˜) , 0 < x ≤ u˜,
V ∗0 (u1) + k(x− u1)−K, x ≥ u˜.
Since V ∗0 (u˜) = V ∗0 (u1) + k(u˜− u1)−K, we can conclude that
k
∫ u˜
u1
(
1− g
′(y)
g′(u˜)
)
dy = K.
Define the function G as
G(x) = k
∫ u¯1
u1
(
1− g
′(y)
g′(x)
)
dy, u˜ ≤ x ≤ u¯1.
Since u¯1 > u˜ > x
∗, g′(x) is increasing on [u˜, u¯1]. Therefore, G is a continuous and increasing
function. Furthermore,
G(u˜) = k
∫ u¯1
u1
(
1− g
′(y)
g′(u˜)
)
dy
= k
∫ u˜
u1
(
1− g
′(y)
g′(u˜)
)
dy + k
∫ u¯1
u˜
(
1− g
′(y)
g′(u˜)
)
dy
= K + k
∫ u¯1
u˜
(
1− g
′(y)
g′(u˜)
)
dy ≤ K,
and
G(u¯1) = k
∫ u¯1
u1
(
1− g
′(y)
g′(u¯1)
)
dy ≥ k
∫ u˜
u1
(
1− g
′(y)
g′(u¯1)
)
dy ≥ k
∫ u˜
u1
(
1− g
′(y)
g′(u˜)
)
dy = K,
so there must exist a uˆ ∈ [u˜, u¯1] such that G(uˆ) = K, that is
k
∫ u¯1
u1
(
1− g
′(y)
g′(uˆ)
)
dy = K. (A.16)
Let Vˆ be defined as
Vˆ (x) =
 k
g(x)
g′(uˆ) , 0 < x ≤ u¯1,
Vˆ (u¯1) + k(x− u¯1), x > u¯1.
(A.17)
Then LVˆ (x) = 0 for 0 < x < u¯1 and by (A.16),
Vˆ (u¯1) = Vˆ (u1) + k(u¯1 − u1)−K.
Using this together with (A.17) then gives for x > u¯1,
Vˆ (x) = Vˆ (u1) + k(x− u1)−K.
Therefore, Vˆ also solves Problem D, so by uniqueness Vˆ = V .
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To finish the proof, let first x ∈ [u1, u˜]. It follows from [7] when (u˜, u1) = (u¯∗, u∗), and from
Lemma A4 when (u˜, u1) = (u¯0, u0), that V
∗′
0 (x) = k
g′(x)
g′(u˜) ≤ k. Since uˆ ≥ u˜ > x∗ and g′(x) is
increasing on (x∗,∞), V ′(x) = k g′(x)g′(uˆ) ≤ k g
′(x)
g′(u˜) ≤ k. Finally, let x ∈ [u˜, u˜1]. Since V ′(u˜) ≤ k,
V ′(uˆ) = k and V ′(x) = k g
′(x)
g′(uˆ) is increasing on [u˜, u¯1), we can conclude that V
′(x) ≤ k on [u˜, uˆ]
and V ′(x) ≥ k on [uˆ, u¯1). 
Note that V ′(x) and V ′′(x) exist and are continuous except for when x = u¯1. Let V
′−(u¯1)
and V
′+(u¯1) be the left derivative and right derivative of V (x) at u¯1. From Lemma A.6 we can
see that V
′−(u¯1) ≥ k = V ′+(u¯1). Therefore V (x) may fail to be differentiable at the point u¯1
if V
′−(u¯1) > k. Thus, the classical Itoˆ formula can not be applied, but its generalization, the
Meyer-Itoˆ formula is applicable. Since we are working with functions of the form e−λtf(Yt), the
standard Meyer-Itoˆ formula needs a slight, but straightforward, modification.
Lemma A.7. Let f be the difference of two convex functions and f
′− be its left derivative. Let
Lat =
∫ t
0
e−λtdLat,0,
where Lat,0 is the local time of Y at a. Then for a semimartingale Y the following equation holds:
e−λtf(Yt) = f(Y0) +
∫ t
0
e−λsf
′−(Ys−)dYs −
∫ t
0
λe−λsf(Ys−)ds
+
∑
0<s≤t
e−λs
(
f(Ys)− f(Ys−)− f ′−(Ys−)∆Ys
)
+
1
2
∫ +∞
−∞
Latµ(da),
where µ is the signed measure (when restricted to compacts) which is the second derivative of f
in the generalized function sense. Furthermore, for every bounded Borel measurable function v,∫ +∞
−∞
Lat v(a)da =
∫ t
0
e−λsv(Ys)d[Y, Y ]cs, (A.18)
where [Y, Y ]cs is the quadratic variation of the continuous martingale part of Y .
Proof. The first part follows from Theorem 70, Chapter IV, in [10] using that
d(e−λtf(Yt)) = −λe−λtf(Yt)dt + e−λtdf(Yt) and Fubini’s theorem on the local time term.
Formula (A.18) follows from Corollary 1, Chapter IV, in [10] and an application of Fubini’s
theorem.
Lemma A.8. Let V be the solution of Problem D. Then, for pi ∈ Π1, the following equation
holds:
e−λ(t∧τ
pi)V (Xpit∧τpi+) = V (X
pi
0 ) +
∫ t∧τpi
0
e−λsV
′−(Xpis )dX
pi
s −
∫ t∧τpi
0
λe−λsV (Xpis )ds
+
∑
0<s≤t
e−λs
(
V (Xpis+)− V (Xpis )− V
′−(Xpis )∆X
pi
s
)
−1
2
Lu¯1t∧τpi(k1 − k) +
1
2
∫ t∧τpi
0
e−λsσ2(Xpis )V
′′−(Xpis )ds,
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where k1 is the left derivative of V (x) at u¯1.
Proof Since V ′(x) and V ′′(x) exist and are continuous except for at x = u¯1, and V
′±(u¯1),
V
′′±(u¯1) exist and are finite, some fairly straightforward calculations show that V (x) can be
written as the difference of the two convex functions
V1(x) = xV
′+(0) +
∫ x
0
∫ y
0
(V
′′
(z))+dzdy,
V2(x) = (k1 − k)(x− u¯1)+ +
∫ x
0
∫ y
0
(V
′′
(z))−dzdy,
where x+ = max(x, 0) and x− = −min(x, 0). By the property of V (x), we have that
1
2
∫ +∞
−∞
Lat∧τpiµ(da) =
1
2
Lu¯1t∧τpi(V
′+(u¯1)− V ′−(u¯1)) + 1
2
∫ +∞
−∞
Lat∧τpiV
′′−(a)da
=
1
2
Lu¯1t∧τpi(k − k1) +
1
2
∫ +∞
−∞
Lat∧τpiV
′′−(a)da.
The identity (A.18) shows that
1
2
∫ +∞
−∞
Lat∧τpiV
′′−(a)da =
1
2
∫ t∧τpi
0
e−λsσ2(Xpis )V
′′−(Xpis )ds.
The result now follows from Lemma A.7. 
Lemma A.9 Let V be the solution of Problem D and define the operator L− by
L−V (x) = 1
2
σ2(x)V
′′−(x) + µ(x)V
′−(x)− λV (x).
Then V satisfies the following quasi-variational inequalities
L−V (x) = 0, 0 < x ≤ u¯1, (A.19)
L−V (x) ≤ 0, x > u¯1, (A.20)
V (x) = MV (x), x ≥ u¯1. (A.21)
Here the operator M is as in (A.4), but with the lower limit there u0 replaced by u1.
Proof By the construction of V (x), (A.19) holds. To prove (A.20), let x > u¯1. Then
L−V (x) = 1
2
σ2(x)V
′′−(x) + µ(x)V
′−(x)− λV (x) = µ(x)k − λV (x).
Since by Assumption A4, µ′(x) ≤ λ, and the fact that V ′(x) = k on (u¯1,∞), the function
µ(x)k − λV (x) is decreasing on (u¯1,∞). Therefore,
L−V (x) = µ(x)k − λV (x) ≤ µ(u¯1)k − λV (u¯1).
If µ(u¯1) ≤ 0, then clearly L−V (x) ≤ 0. If µ(u¯1) > 0, by u¯1 > u¯ > x∗, V ′′−(u¯1) = k g
′′(u¯1)
g(uˆ) ≥ 0.
Then, since V
′−(u¯1) ≥ k and µ(u¯1) > 0, we have
µ(u¯1)k − λV (u¯1) ≤ 1
2
σ2(u¯1)V
′′−(u¯1) + µ(u¯1)V
′−(u¯1)− λV (u¯1) = 0, x > u¯1.
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Finally, we prove (A.21). By Lemma A.6, for x ≥ u¯1,
V ′(x− η)− k

≥ 0, 0 < η < x− uˆ,
≤ 0, x− uˆ ≤ η ≤ x− u1,
so optimality is achieved either by remaining at x or by going down all the way to u1. This gives
MV (x) = Max{V (x)−K,V (u1)− k(x− u1)−K}
= Max{V (u1)− k(x− u1)− 2K,V (u1)− k(x− u1)−K} (A.22)
= V (u1)− k(x− u1)−K = V (x).

Proof of Theorem 3.2. For pi ∈ Π1 we easily get from Lemma A.8
e−λ(t∧τ
pi)V (Xpit∧τpi+) = V (x) +
∫ t∧τpi
0
e−λsL−V (Xpis )ds+
∫ t∧τpi
0
e−λsσ2(Xpis )V
′−(Xpis )dWs
+
∑
0≤τpin≤t∧τpi
e−λτ
pi
n
(
V (Xpiτpin+)− V (Xpiτpin )
)
− 1
2
Lt∧τpi(u¯1)(k1 − k).
Since pi ∈ Π1 it is necessary that that Xpiτpin− ≥ u¯1. Then by Lemma A.9 and the fact that k1 ≥ k,
e−λ(t∧τ
pi)V (Xpit∧τpi+) ≤ V (x) +
∫ t∧τpi
0
e−λsσ2(Xpis−)V
′−(Xpis )dWs +
∑
0≤τpin≤t∧τpi
e−λτ
pi
n (K − kξpin).
Taking expectations gives
0 ≤ V (x)− Ex
 ∑
0≤τpin≤t∧τpi
e−λs(kξpin −K)
− Ex[e−λ(t∧τpi)V (Xpit∧τpi+)].
Letting t→∞, we have by nonnegativity of V ,
V (x) ≥ Ex
[ ∞∑
n=1
e−λτ
pi
n (kξpin −K)
]
= Vpi(x).
Taking the supremum over all strategies in Π1 gives
V (x) ≥ V ∗1 (x). (A.23)
Now consider the lump sum dividend barrier strategy pi1 = piu¯1,u1 . By definition of that
strategy, Xpi1s ≤ u¯1 for all s > 0. Therefore, L−(Xpi1s ) = Lu¯1s = 0 for all s > 0 and so
e−λ(t∧τ
pi1 )V (Xpi1t∧τpi1+) = V (x) +
∫ t∧τpi1
0
e−λsσ2(Xpi1s )V
′−(Xpi1s )dWs
+
∑
0≤τpi1n ≤t∧τpi1
e−λτ
pi1
n
(
V (Xpi1
τ
pi1
n +
)− V (Xpi1
τ
pi1
n
)
)
.
Furthermore, by (A.22)
V (x) = MV (x) = V (u1) + k(x− u1)−K, x ≥ u¯1.
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Arguing as at the end of the proof of Theorem 3.1 now gives
e−λ(t∧τ
pi1 )V (Xpi1t∧τpi1+) = V (x) +
∫ t∧τpi1
0
e−λsσ2(Xpi1s )V
′−(Xpi1s )dWs +
∑
0≤τpi1n ≤t∧τpi1
e−λτ
pi1
n (K − kξpi1n ).
Taking expectations and then letting t → ∞ results in V (x) = Vu¯1,u1(x) which implies that
V (x) ≤ V ∗1 (x). Together with (A.23) we can therefore conclude that V ∗1 (x) = V (x) = Vu¯1,u1(x).

Proof of Theorem 4.1. By Theorem 2.1 and its proof in [7], Vu¯,u(u¯)(x) is increasing in u¯. If
u(u¯) → ∞ as u¯ → ∞, there is nothing to prove, so assume that u(u¯) ≤ m for all u¯ for some
positive m. Given δ > 0, choose u¯ > b so large that Vu¯,u(u¯)(x) > V
∗(x)− δ2 ∀x ∈ [0, b], and also
so that ln u¯ > m. Consider the two dividend barrier lump sum strategies:
1. The strategy pi0 = piu¯,u(u¯).
2. The strategy pi1 = piu¯,ln u¯.
The strategy pi1 clearly satisfies the conditions of the theorem. Let τ be the first time the process
hits u¯ (with τ = ∞ if it hits 0 before u¯). By definition, τ is the same for both strategies when
x ≤ u¯. By the strong Markov property we have for x ∈ [0, b],
Vpii(x) = Ex[e
−λτ ]Vpii(u¯), i = 0, 1.
Now since ln u¯ > m,
Vpi0(u¯) ≤ ku¯+ Vpi0(ln u¯)−K,
Vpi1(u¯) = k(u¯− ln u¯) + Vpi1(ln u¯)−K.
Therefore
Vpi0(x)− Vpi1(x) ≤ Ex[e−λτ ](k ln u¯+ Vpi0(ln u¯)− Vpi1(ln u¯)).
Using this equation with x = ln u¯ gives
Vpi0(ln u¯)− Vpi1(ln u¯) ≤ k
Eln u¯
[
e−λτ
]
1− Eln u¯ [e−λτ ] ln u¯,
and so
Vpi0(x)− Vpi1(x) ≤ kEx[e−λτ ]
1
1− Eln u¯ [e−λτ ] ln u¯. (A.24)
By Assumption A4, µ(x) ≤ µ(0) +λx, so by letting τ ′ be the same as τ , but with the drift µ(x)
replaced by µ(0) + λx, it is clear that Ex[e
−λτ ] ≤ Ex[e−λτ ′ ]. Define hu¯(x) = Ex[e−λτ ′ ] so that
hu¯(0) = 0 and hu¯(u¯) = 1. Furthermore, by standard results, see e.g. [4] Ch. 15.3, hu¯ satisfies
1
2
σ2(x)h′′u¯(x) + (λx+ µ(0))h
′
u¯(x)− λhu¯(x) = 0.
One solution of this equation is
h1(x) = λx+ µ(0).
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Another solution is then given as, see e.g. [12] p.31,
h2(x) = h1(x)
∫ ∞
x
1
h21(y)
e
−2 ∫ y0 λt+µ(0)σ2(t) dtdy
≤ h1(x)
∫ ∞
x
1
h21(y)
e−c
∫ y
0
1
1+t
dtdy
= h1(x)
∫ ∞
x
1
h21(y)
(1 + y)−cdy → 0 as x→∞.
Here we used Assumption A.1 in the first inequality, where c is a suitable positive constant.
Fitting the boundary conditions we get
hu¯(x) =
1
λu¯+ µ(0)
(
1− h2(u¯)h2(0)
) (λx+ µ(0)(1− h2(x)
h2(0)
))
.
Therefore, hu¯(x) ∼ (λu¯)−1 as u¯ gets large and x is fixed, and this proves the result by (A.24),
choosing u¯ so large that Vpi0(x) − Vpi1(x) ≤ δ2 for all x ∈ [0, b]. Note that in the proof we may
have used u¯γ with 0 < γ < 1 instead of ln u¯. 
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